On August 28, 2025, Dreame officially declared its ambition to build the world's fastest car. Founder Yu Hao proclaimed in an open letter: "Car-making is the crown of industry, the ultimate battlefield of technology, and a 'nine-death' expedition." Yet, this high-profile "automotive expedition" has hit a sharp reversal in less than a year.

Over the past four months, cross-verified information from multiple sources, including business registrations, on-site project visits, observations at office premises, and insights from internal insiders, reveals that Dreame's auto executives have been actively seeking external jobs. Project staff are facing mass resignations and layoffs, and large swaths of office space sit idle—multiple signs point to significant setbacks for Dreame's ambitious car-making venture.

Deserted Office Floors and Idle Workstations

On a weekday morning in late August, between 9 and 10 AM, a visit to the Star Project's office at an industrial park in Wuzhong District, Suzhou, showed a stark reality. The lobby directory in Building 6 indicated the project occupied five floors. An employee, Li Da, revealed that the main office areas were concentrated on floors 9 to 11. On the day of the visit, at least two-thirds of the workstations on the 9th floor were vacant, with no personal items or signs of activity on the desks.

Li Da noted that during peak times, the team swelled to 700-800 people, with about three-quarters of the desks occupied. At its zenith, Dreame publicly claimed a nearly 1,000-person car-making team. Walking through the 10th and 11th floors revealed similar scenes of empty desks and stacked storage boxes. In one area marked for live streaming, unused office chairs were piled high in a corner. Li Da explained that layoffs were being executed according to an August list, a process that began over two months prior, with each round cutting approximately 25% of staff.

According to Li Da, after this round of layoffs, the Star Project is expected to retain only a handful of senior executives. "The company also owes significant amounts to car suppliers, so those left behind are likely there for cleanup duties," he said. He recalled that during the peak last year, both the above-ground and underground parking lots were completely full, with parking only available on a temporary basis. Now, the underground garage shows vast numbers of empty spaces. Local business insiders in the park confirmed that the company has been downsizing recently, with food delivery orders steadily declining over the past two months.

Dozens of Directors Simultaneously Job Hunting

Li Da admitted that while he expected a new EV startup might last only three to five years, he never anticipated the layoffs would come so swiftly. Dreame's public image took a sharp downturn in May following a viral social media post. Li Da noted that even before that, local government authorities were already assessing their ties with Dreame; the article just vocalized what was an open secret internally. The ensuing public backlash put a brake on Dreame's "small bets, big wins" growth model.

Having mentally prepared for the sudden shift, Li Da said most colleagues felt a sense of relief when HR initiated exit discussions. Headhunters had already caught on. Since May, Sheng Jinlong, general manager of Suzhou Zhaorui Talent Management Consulting, observed a surge of Dreame employees posting resumes online, with over 20 at the director level alone. He noted that large-scale layoffs at the Star Project began in June, and since then, a flood of resumes featuring Star Project experience has appeared on job sites.

A search for "Star Project Director" on one platform alone surfaced over 40 candidate profiles, spanning product, finance, government relations, supply chain, procurement, sales, and R&D. Most were around 40 years old, with the oldest at 45, and their tenures at Dreame ranged from six months to over a year. "This is just the director level—the company's core backbone. If we expand to managers, the numbers would be much higher," Sheng said. These individuals, some still employed and some already departed, show high daily activity on recruiting platforms. For a startup of nearly 1,000 people, having dozens of directors job hunting simultaneously is a powerful signal.

Chen Meng, who joined the Star Project from another automaker in April, stated that the current headcount is down to roughly 100 people. "They genuinely wanted to build cars at the start," she reflected.

A Dream That Once Seemed Real

On the 9th floor, a promotional wall chronicles the Star Project's public appearances, including airport advertisements in major cities. According to the timeline, Dreame codenamed the car project "Star Project" in February 2023. The last major event recorded was its appearance at the AWE conference in March, followed by a "Berlin Global 1,000-Person Conference coming soon" note for May. "Then everything just stopped," Li Da said. The project's official WeChat account ceased updates on May 28, with its final post featuring airport ad clips and a prior statement on equity freezes.

Public awareness of Dreame's car ambitions largely began with the high-profile announcement on August 28 last year, promising a first model to rival the Bugatti Veyron, with mass production slated for 2027. At CES in January, Yu Hao unveiled the Nebula NEXT 01, a moment immortalized on the promotional wall. Subsequently, the project showcased three Nebula NEXT 01 models. During the visit, a red model was discovered in the underground garage, covered and fenced off. Li Da revealed it was a non-functional mockup—one of ten customized in different colors, each costing around 3 million yuan. "We genuinely wanted to build cars; we spent heavily on user research to gather consumer feedback," he said. However, he and his colleagues gradually realized that the pace was far too slow to meet the 2027 production target.

Dreame's approach was a "horse race" strategy, simultaneously pursuing its own manufacturing qualifications, contract manufacturing with partners, and overseas factory plans. "The company would adopt whichever succeeded first, but none of the three materialized," Li Da explained. "Major decisions need sign-off; without Yu Hao's approval, we couldn't move forward." One domestic factory plan, announced in March 2025 in East China, proposed a 414,400-square-meter site. A visit in late May revealed overgrown grass and even basic farmland protection markers on parts of the land, indicating no progress. Similarly, claims of overseas plants, initial funding rounds, and contract manufacturing partnerships have shown no tangible results.

Three Automotive Business Units All Stumble

Within the Dreame ecosystem, three business units (BUs) were dedicated to building sports cars: Star Project, Star Future, and Interstellar Voyage. Late last year, rumors circulated about a partnership with CHERY AUTO (09973.HK), fueled by a photo of Chery chairman Yin Tongyue and Dreame's Chen Longdong. However, Chery twice denied any collaboration. Chen Longdong was the legal representative of Star Future (Suzhou) Automotive Technology Co., Ltd., registered in June 2025 with 50 million yuan capital, which operated the "Dreame Auto" WeChat account. That account has since disappeared, leaving only "Star Project Auto" and "Star Future Auto."

The "Star Future Auto" account contains a single post stating Chen Longdong joined Dreame in June 2025, led the Star Future BU, and departed in May 2026. It also announced that from June, the Star Future, Star Project, and Interstellar Voyage businesses would be consolidated under an "Industrial Research Institute" management system, transitioning from project-based to platform-based organization for more efficient collaboration. "We learned about this 'Research Institute' from the news—it doesn't actually exist internally," Li Da said. The mobile phone BU, also reportedly moved under the institute, has similarly seen its team dwindle.

During the site visit, the 5th floor of Building 5, marked as Star Future's location, was completely empty on a workday. Offices and meeting rooms echoed with silence, and new desks and chairs showed no signs of use. On the 6th floor, a live-streaming room was littered with trash, and a "M" logo from MOVA, Dreame's high-end home appliance sub-brand, hung precariously. Another MOVA streaming room was equally messy. A display area featured a banner reading "DREAM IT, DO IT!" with rows of pristine, empty desks, and a "Dreame S-Class Million Sales Consultant" trophy left behind hinted at busier days.

During its automotive push, Dreame also incubated two battery ventures: Lightyear Engine for consumer applications and Crystal Core Energy for solid-state automotive batteries. A former Lightyear Engine employee confirmed mass layoffs at his departure, describing it as an amicable separation with compensation. Reflecting on his time at the Star Project, Li Da said the above-market salary was a draw, but he was more attracted to the "overtaking on the curve" potential Dreame represented in the fast-evolving EV sector. He acknowledged that the experience, though intense, was invaluable—offering team-building, autonomy, and resources he'd never had before.

Looking ahead, Li Da said he would scrutinize whether any future startup respects its industry. "Only with reverence for the industry will a company truly value technical talent and have a foundation for long-term survival." Sheng Jinlong argued that Dreame's rapid talent expansion and contraction, emblematic of its hundreds of BUs' unbridled growth, reflects a disregard for market talent and the norms of healthy tech competition. "Whether it ultimately succeeds or fails, I hope it preserves some dignity for China's tech circle," he said.