A WeChat public account named "OxfordUniversity" issued a statement on August 6 about the "Oxford Global CEO Programme." The statement said the programme is an executive education initiative developed and implemented by the Oxford Digital Health Institute, part of the University of Oxford's Nuffield Department of Primary Care Health Sciences. Courses are taught by senior Oxford scholars, with guest speakers participating in some sessions. Through modules in Oxford and internationally, the programme offers participants opportunities to engage with academic experts, business leaders, leading institutions, and Oxford's collections. The statement emphasized that the programme focuses on professional development, not academic certification. It carries no credits and includes no formal assessments. Participants who complete it receive a certificate of attendance.
After a previous article was published, some argued that this is a "willing buyer, willing seller" situation, and that dozens of business leaders together form a valuable network, regardless of the certificate. Online rumors suggest many entrepreneurs have already received refunds.
Some have praised the woman responsible for recruiting in China as exceptionally skilled, expressing a desire to meet her. This is a new chapter in the "Oxford Dream" scandal: 1.08 million RMB for a "dream" that turned sour. Over 60 Chinese entrepreneurs, including more than 30 founders of listed companies, each paid 1.08 million RMB in tuition, only to feel deceived. The "Oxford University Global CEO Programme" faced collective complaints from participants, who cited a significant gap between promotional promises and actual delivery, doubts about the project director's title, and the emergence of the true operator.
During the three days in Oxford, the programme's academic lead, Richard Hobbs, reportedly delivered the same PowerPoint presentation four times. Participants also noted that their instructor for "Politics and Democracy" was a British surgeon and medical scholar, whose originally scheduled course was "Health, Life Sciences, and Democracy." Half a day was spent queuing for library cards at the Bodleian Library, involving registration, photographing, and card collection. They were then split into two groups for a half-day tour of the Weston Library, with one group waiting while the other toured. In essence, one and a half of the three days were spent on library card applications and library visits, which included viewing Chinese ancient texts like the "Yongle Encyclopedia" and "Fuxi's Sixty-Four Hexagrams." One participant commented that these activities were "completely irrelevant to the business management needs of a CEO."
This article outlines a business training programme priced at 1.08 million RMB and marketed as a University of Oxford product. The first cohort faced collective complaints just seven days after the course began, citing issues like a lack of basic amenities in accommodation, course content that significantly differed from promotional materials, and corporate visits that felt like tourist bus tours. More concerning is the chain of identities involved: the so-called "Executive Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford" title does not exist, and the real organizer is a different entity.
Section 1: A 1.08 Million RMB Training Business
In 2025, the "Oxford University Global CEO Programme" recruited Chinese entrepreneurs with a tuition fee of 1.08 million RMB, plus an additional 48,000 RMB for living services during the UK and Germany modules. The programme spanned 30 months, including 11 compulsory overseas modules, 3 compulsory domestic modules, and several practical modules. The first cohort comprised over 60 participants, including chairpersons of listed companies, a former provincial richest person, and liquor industry entrepreneurs. Many were recruited via phone calls using purchased contact lists of entrepreneurs. Sales tactics emphasized "limited interview spots" and "imminent start date" to create urgency. In September 2025, the first cohort traveled to the UK for a 7-day European module (3 days in Oxford, UK; 4 days in Germany for visits). After the course, over ten participants, including one using the pseudonym "Zhang Jun," filed collective complaints about the course quality and the programme's authenticity, demanding refunds.
Section 2: Gap Between Promises and Reality
Comparing promotional materials with participant feedback, the European module's actual delivery differed significantly from the programme description. Promotional claims included: three days of courses at Oxford taught by internationally renowned scholars; in-depth visits to German companies like Bosch and TRUMPF with executive lectures; recruitment of global entrepreneurs for an international academic atmosphere; granting of "Oxford University Visiting Scholar" status and library card benefits; and accommodation and travel arranged to high-end standards. The actual situation reported by participants included: a crowded classroom with an unstable translator, and the same PowerPoint was repeated by the same lecturer. The bus only drove around the factory areas of German companies, with no management interaction and executive lectures were absent. Of the 60+ participants, only 2 were foreign nationals, reportedly invited by the programme organizers. The library card was available to various校外人员, not a unique benefit. Accommodation was in student dorms lacking drinking water and toiletries, and meals were often pizza or a 21-euro buffet.
In a written communication dated October 5, participants categorized their issues as: course delivery not matching promises, content irrelevant to CEO management needs, poor travel service support, and a lack of opening ceremony formality. On October 16, the programme organizer responded on behalf of the Oxford Digital Health Institute, acknowledging areas for improvement in the UK and Germany modules' curriculum and administrative services, and refunded half of the UK living service fee (24,000 RMB). Most participants accepted this, and the programme continued with subsequent modules. The Far East module (Hong Kong and Singapore) in December 2025 proceeded as scheduled, with 52 participants attending.
Section 3: Who is Behind This? An Unclear Identity Chain
In the programme's recruitment materials, Richard Hobbs was introduced as the "Executive Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford." However, the University of Oxford's official website shows no such formal position exists. During the recruitment period, Hobbs was actually serving as the "Honorary Vice-Chancellor" of the University of Oxford, a role described as assisting with ceremonial duties, such as presiding over graduation ceremonies. Hobbs' other role is Professor of Primary Care Medicine at the Nuffield Department of Primary Care Health Sciences, and he was the department head from 2011 to 2024. Academically, the "Oxford University Global CEO Programme" is not run by the Oxford business school but is affiliated with the Oxford Digital Health Institute under the Nuffield Department of Primary Care Health Sciences, with Hobbs and Alexandra Lumbers, Academic Director of Jesus College, listed as academic leads.
According to programme exit documents, the actual organizer is the UK-based "National Academy of Science and Art," established in 2017 and headquartered in Oxford. Public reports indicate that its Executive Director, Li Yixuan, was also the programme's real manager. Participants reported that Li Yixuan did not appear publicly for nearly a month after the course started, only issuing a written response after the collective complaints. The contract signed by participants lists "Oxford Zhongqi (Beijing) Technology Co., Ltd." as the party, a company registered in March 2025, shortly before the first cohort's recruitment. Li Yixuan's public resume shows she was born in 1988 and graduated from Minzu University of China. A claim about her being a "sports specialty student" was not independently verified and is not included in this article.
Section 4: Refunds and Rights Protection: The Contract Traps Participants
According to public reports, some participants secured partial refunds after multiple rounds of negotiation, with one getting about 80% back and another about 70%. Another report mentions a participant who, after threatening to report the matter to the police in Hong Kong, received an 80% refund. Notably, the programme organizer's exit notice did not classify these as standard refunds but framed them as "forced removal from the programme due to repeated violations of the programme's spirit." Participants reported that their service agreement stipulated that once Oxford University issued a visiting scholar certificate, they would have "no objections, no disputes, and would guarantee not to make any claims, requests, or demands" against the organizer. Since the contract was with a newly registered tech company, even if participants won a lawsuit, actual recovery of funds would be questionable. Ultimately, about 8 to 10 participants chose to leave the programme, while the rest continued with the subsequent modules.
Section 5: Industry Context: The Pricing Logic of CEO Programmes
The "Oxford University Global CEO Programme" is not an isolated case but a product of the continuously stratifying and evolving market for entrepreneur education in China. Official business schools like Tsinghua, Peking University, CEIBS, and CKGSB operate high-end EDP programmes with tuition typically ranging from 100,000 to 500,000 RMB, with relatively standardized admission processes. Market-based third-party training institutions rely on the IP of their mentors or founders for recruitment, lacking official university backing. In between are numerous总裁研修班 (president training classes) run by university continuing education departments and programmes operated by professors leveraging departmental resources with external partners—the model for this case. Industry insiders note that as the high-end training market becomes saturated, admission hurdles have loosened from "1 in 20" to "1 in 10," and some institutions now buy entrepreneur contact lists for telemarketing. The claim that "CEO classes are a step above EMBA" has no basis in the official education system. MBA and EMBA are nationally recognized degree programmes, while CEO-type programmes are generally non-degree training, issuing only completion certificates. The industry's long-standing logic is to sustain high pricing by using names like总裁班, CEO班, Founder班, and实控人闭门班 (actual controller closed-door classes) to create a perception of scarcity and exclusivity within the circle.
⚠️ Risk Warning and Verification Note: Core facts about the programme's course content and participant experiences in this article come from an investigative report by reporter Huang Yiting of Mirror Workshop/Business the Mirror. Interviewees in that report are pseudonyms, and this article continues that practice without speculating on real identities. The identity chain of the programme organizer (Richard Hobbs' title, Li Yixuan's identity, and the company's registration details) is based on publicly available information from the University of Oxford and the original report. This article has not independently contacted the parties involved. No determination is made regarding whether Hobbs, Li Yixuan, or the company had subjective fraudulent intent. All statements are objective descriptions of reported facts and participant complaints, not a characterization of matters not yet determined by judicial or regulatory processes. Sources and verification: Information on programme fees, participant composition, the European module itinerary, and complaints (from Mirror Workshop/Business the Mirror's original investigation); the University of Oxford's official position system and Richard Hobbs' employment information (from the University of Oxford website); and the organizer's registration information (from Southern Weekly reports and public business registration). Unilateral claims, such as the existence of subjective fraudulent intent, remain unverified. This content uses AI for information collection and chart creation. Any issues, please provide feedback for correction. © Lingtong Society 2026 · In-depth Analysis