The number of listed companies in developed global public stock markets has been steadily declining in recent years, with initial public offerings becoming increasingly rare. Existing listed companies are also being lost to merger and acquisition activity, with private equity funds playing a significant role in this trend.

This phenomenon is particularly pronounced in the United States, where the number of publicly traded companies has nearly halved since the beginning of the century. However, with the anticipated initial public offerings of giant firms like SpaceX, the market is closely watching whether the global IPO slump is about to turn a corner. Concurrently, US technology companies including OpenAI and Anthropic are also expected to follow suit with listings.

Against the backdrop of sustained growth in capital expenditure related to artificial intelligence, the demand for equity and debt financing will rise in tandem. Analysts suggest that intense competition from emerging markets has tilted developed economies from capital-intensive manufacturing towards the services sector. Meanwhile, the rapid expansion of the private market—which grew from approximately $500 billion to $600 billion at the turn of the century to $7.6 trillion in 2022—has provided companies with more flexible financing options, leading non-public companies to remain private for extended periods.

The AI investment boom signals a return to capital-intensive development models for developed economies, but Europe is lagging behind in this process. Although the UK boasts a more active technology sector than continental Europe, its tech IPOs have shown a trend of migrating to New York. The UK's long-term "de-equitization" process is partly attributed to a significant reduction in allocations to UK equities by traditional stock buyers, such as domestic pension funds. By 2023, the proportion of UK equities in defined-benefit pension plans had fallen from 32% to less than 2%. Accounting standards require companies to list pension deficits as liabilities on their balance sheets, prompting corporate treasurers to advise trustees to shift towards low-risk bond portfolios.

In response to the shrinking number of listed companies, policy measures in the US and UK have focused on relaxing listing rules to reduce listing costs and disclosure burdens. However, some scholars argue that this strategy may be based on a misdiagnosis. The economic weight of US-listed companies has not halved; over the past three decades, total stock market capitalization, corporate profits, revenue, investment, and employment have all grown substantially. Policymakers have focused excessively on deregulation, while "de-equitization" partly reflects industrial concentration resulting from lax competition policy.

The situation in the UK differs, with its stock market capitalization as a share of GDP declining and market performance relatively weak. However, given the negative lessons of lax regulation during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the UK's reliance on financial deregulation to stimulate economic growth has raised questions. Some analysts believe that policymakers have been overly focused on maintaining the City of London's international status, leading to a misdirected response to the problem of declining listed companies.

The capital market's focus has shifted from primary financing to refinancing and capital redistribution, with the primary equity market playing a secondary role within the vast global system of currency, derivatives, debt, and repurchase markets. Related research has also not found a significant financing gap for UK companies. In terms of economic policy direction, some scholars invoke Keynes' discourse on "enterprise spirit," emphasizing the fundamental role of business activity in wealth accumulation. For the UK government, the focus should be on tax and planning reforms to encourage industrial development, rather than succumbing to lobbying pressure from the financial industry to relax regulations and lower corporate governance standards.